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Abstract—
Vehicular Ad-hoc NETworks (VANET) have revolutionised the
intelligent transportation systems. Indeed, they enable vehicles
to communicate with each other and with the infrastructure,
and they facilitate several vital applications in real-time. Several
trust models have been proposed to ensure a secured VANET
and the authenticity, integrity and reliability of information
exchanged in the network. The concept of trust models is to
introduce and implement trust explicitly in the vehicular nodes.
In this paper, we propose a lightweight evaluation methodology to
evaluate trust models, specifically designed for VANET. Our study
focused on the three categories of VANET trust models (TMs):
Entity-oriented Trust Models (ETM), Data oriented Trust Models
(DTM) and Combined Trust Models (CTM). Our simulations
evaluate the efficiency of the trust models and compare them
against several trust related parameters: false positive rate,
precision and accuracy level in detecting malicious nodes. Since
the scope of this research work is to evaluate the performance
of TMs under adversary conditions, we have considered on-off
attacks which can act as man-in-the-middle to drop and delay
transmitted packets.
Keywords—Trust Models, Vehicular ad hoc networks, Internet-
of-Things, Smart Cities, Intelligent Transportation Systems
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet-of-Things (IoT) has evolved rapidly over the
past few years enabling every device with computation, storage
and communication capabilities to connect to the Internet and
provide a variety of applications including smart health, smart
transportation, smart grids etc [1], [2]. The Vehicular Ad-
hoc NETwork (VANET) is an important application of IoT,
where smart and connected vehicles equipped with sensors
(e.g., GPS, distance sensors, cameras etc.) communicate with
each other to ensure traffic safety and improve traffic effi-
ciency. This involves propagating sensitive information se-
curely through the network. As a result, this information must
arrive at the destination vehicles unchanged. However, VANET
are large-scale networks which could contain misbehaving
vehicles (or attackers) that have the ability to launch a wide
range of attacks which can affect critical applications. These
attacks include man-in-the-middle, Sybil, black-hole or denial-
of-service in the network [3]–[6]. Providing and maintaining
security within a VANET is extremely challenging.
In order to ensure security in VANETs, various solutions
have been proposed that rely on traditional cryptography and a
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). However, a VANET is a very
volatile network and as a result, the presence of such an in-
frastructure cannot be guaranteed. Furthermore, these solutions
fail to identify insider attacks with valid certificates. In order
to solve these issues, recently trust management is proposed
as an alternative security measure, which has the ability
to overcome the challenges posed by cryptographic-based
solutions. Trust-based systems create a trusted environment
where the vehicles can disseminate and share messages in
collaboration. We define trust in VANET as the assurance and
faith which source vehicle places on the destination vehicle
for the accomplishment of desired task. However, evaluating
trust in VANET is extremely challenging due to high mobility
and random placement of the vehicles in the network. To date,
various VANET trust models (TMs) are proposed with the aim
to achieve security via trust management, for instance [7]–
[10]. Every designed TM has different philosophy to compute
trust. For instance, some other TMs compute trust based on the
data transmitted and some TMs relies on sender’s behaviour
to calculate trust.
Current proposed TMs can be broadly categorized into
three classes, namely: (1) Entity-based trust models (ETM),
(2) Data-based trust models (DTM), and (3) Combined trust
models (CTM) [11]–[14]. ETM computes trust on the vehicle
itself to eliminate misbehaving vehicles from the network.
DTM, on the other hand, establishes trust on the vehicles
based on the received messages, while CTM combines the
characteristics of both ETM and DTM for trust computation
where both data and node trustworthiness is taken into account
[15]. Under the umbrella of these TMs categories, vehicles can
adapt any mechanism to establish trust in a VANET. Therefore,
there should be a mechanism which can validate and evaluate
these TMs in VANETs before integrating them within the real
environment due to the sensitive nature involved. We propose
a novel mechanism to evaluate and validate TMs in VANET.
The major contributions of this paper are: (1) First, we propose
a light-weight and efficient methodology to evaluate TMs in
VANETs and (2) we validate our proposal using extensive
simulations and compared the efficiency of three TMs from
different categories.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II
provide details about the proposed methodology and mecha-
nism. Section III introduces the implemented TMs, followed
by their performance evaluation in Section IV where the sim-
ulation setup and evaluation metrics are identified. Simulation
results are presented and explained in Section V. The paper
culminates with conclusions and future work in Section VI.
II. PROPOSED METHODOLOGY
In this section, we provide the details of our proposed
mechanism that is designed for evaluating and comparing
TMs. The high-level view of the proposed methodology is
depicted in Fig. 1. This shows that our model has the following
modules:
• Attacker Model
• Trust Models
• Initial Message Evaluation
• Data-Centric Trust Computation
• Node-Centric Trust Computation
• Overall Trust Evaluation
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Fig. 1. Proposed Methodology
A. Attacker Model
TMs ensure the propagation of trusted content within the
network. This module is identified, so that the efficiency of the
TM can be evaluated in presence of adversary nodes as they
attempt to compromise the performance of the network. As a
VANET is an open, decentralised and large-scale network, it
faces a wide range of attacks including man-in-the-middle,
on-off (zig-zag), denial-of-service, spoofing, bad-mouthing,
black-hole and grey-hole attacks etc [3]–[6]. Therefore, this
module is designed specifically for evaluating TMs in presence
of attacker nodes. This module can contain any attack model.
However, for this specific study, we considered on-off attack
where the attacker is acting as a man-in-the-middle to drop or
delay the data packets.
B. Trust Models
The next phase of our proposal is the identification of TMs
in VANETs. In this phase, we identify TMs with different phi-
losophy to evaluate trust in a VANET, i.e. the TMs can either
establish and evaluate trust on data or entity or combined. In
this paper, we identify three TMs (ETM, DTM, CTM) for the
evaluation and comparison purpose, which evaluate trust using
different techniques.
C. Initial Message Evaluation
In VANETs, every vehicle broadcasts messages which con-
tains important information including data, location, time,
and message IDs [16]. In this module, we performed an
initial evaluation on the messages received from the ve-
hicles based on two parameters: (1) Location approxima-
tion of node A (AppLocA), and (2) Message delivery
time (Timedelivered(M )) of the message M . Every vehicle
is equipped with GPS and map modules which are con-
stantly updating throughout their journey in the network.
This can be helpful to approximate the location of the
message sender which can provide message coordinates in
terms of X , Y and Z, i.e., Coord(A)X , Coord(A)Y and
Coord(A)Z . A message is accepted only by the evalua-
tor node (EVN ) if the coordinates of the message sender
are present in the current map (VM ) of the vehicle, i.e.,
Coord(A)X ,Coord(A)Y ,Coord(A)Z ∈ VM .
On the other hand, when a message M is shared at the time
Timecreated , EVN accepts the received message only if:
Timedelivered − Timecreated 6 Thresholdapp (1)
In Equation 1, “Timedelivered” is the current time at the
EVN and “Thresholdapp” represents the acceptable time
threshold which depends on the severity of the application
app used in VANET. For safety applications, Thresholdapp is
usually set to 100 msec [17].
EVN categorizes the messages as malicious if the sender
vehicle fails to satisfy Equation 1 and the criteria that the
message is received from the location, unknown to the EVN .
Messages satisfying these equations are forwarded by the
EVN to the next modules for trust computation, depending
upon the nature of TM.
D. Data-Centric Trust Computation
This module supports TMs that compute trust on data rather
than entity. In this module, trust is computed based on the
quality of the received message (MQ), which varies depending
upon the message generated by the vehicle. If the transmitting
vehicle has a direct link to the event, then higher trust value
is assigned to the vehicles located within the close proximity
of event. This trust value decreases with the increase in the
distance from the event. However, if the transmitting vehicle
has no direct link to the event, then indirect trust (Trustind)
is calculated based on broadcast/drop (B/D) ratio:
Trustind(a, b) =
Broadcast(a, b)
Broadcast(a, b) +Drop(a, b)
(2)
where, Broadcast(a, b) and Drop(a, b) are the number of
broadcast and drop packets by the vehicle. Higher the B/D
ratio, higher the trust value of the transmitting vehicle is. The
high-level view of data-centric trust computation is depicted
in Fig. 2.
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Fig. 2. Data-Centric Trust Computation
E. Node-Centric Trust Computation
In order to compute trust on the node, this module in-
tegrates two specific types of trust computation methods.
(1) Role-oriented trust (ROT), and (2) Experience-oriented
trust EOT. Every network incorporates vehicles which can be
highly trusted, such as police vehicles, public buses, taxis,
and ambulances—trusted vehicles (VehTrusted). ROT refers to
such vehicles, where high trust can be assigned to messages
generated by these vehicles. However, the major portion of the
network disseminate messages generated by ordinary vehicles
(VehOrdinary). These will include both legitimate and misbe-
having vehicles. Therefore, to identify and distinguish mes-
sages generated by these vehicles, EOT is calculated. Trust
level of the transmitting vehicle is increased for legitimate
vehicles and is decreased for misbehaving vehicles. Node-
centric trust computation is given as:
Trustnc =
{
ROT ifveh = VehTrusted
EOT ifveh = VehOrdinary
(3)
In this work, we considered that 5% of the vehicles are
performing ROT, while 95% vehicles are based on EOT.
F. Trust Evaluation
Once, data-centric and node-centric trust are computed, the
next step involves the evaluation of these TMs via our trust
evaluation platform. In order to evaluate trust, we consider
several realistic trust evaluation criteria which we proposed
in our previous work [18]. However, for the demonstration of
our proposal in this work, we considered four specific trust
evaluation criteria as it can exactly provide the information
about the accuracy of the TM. These criteria include (1) false
positive rates, (2) precision, (3) recall, and (4) F-measure.
III. DETAILS OF IMPLEMENTED TRUST MODELS
In this section, we present the three TMs (ETM, DTM,
CTM) which we implemented to validate our proposal.
A. ETM
In order to validate our proposal, we implemented a multi-
faceted based TM which is proposed by Minhas et al. [19].
This TM relies on four sources for the trust computation.
This includes the experience of the message generator, their
role & priority, and majority opinions of the participating
vehicles. In this TM, the EVN shares messages with the
prioritised vehicles within its vicinity and then awaits for the
validity of the received messages. The prioritised vehicles
validate messages based on two significant factors, i.e., (1)
time closeness and (2) location closeness of the messages.
This information is then shared with EVN in the form of
opinions, where a majority opinion is done on the received
opinions from the neighbours. EVN accepts messages only if
the majority of the vehicles validate the trustworthiness of the
messages. Otherwise, EVN follows the advise of the vehicle
having highest role in the network. Further, EVN provides
an honesty reward (ψ) to vehicles providing true report about
the event and punishment (ρ) to vehicles providing malicious
content.
In this work, we used a condition that trust is very hard to
gain, therefore, we assigned higher weights to ρ, i.e., (ρ/ψ =
10).
B. DTM
To validate our framework, we implemented a DTM, where
trust by the EVN is calculated via two mechanisms, i.e., (1)
Direct trust (TD) and (2) Indirect trust (TI ) [20].
1) TD: relies on the quality of the message (MQ). Further
EVN maintains a minimum threshold level for trust which
must be satisfied by every vehicle. Moreover, when a vehicle
provides trusted and true messages, the trust level of that
specific vehicle is incremented by an honesty reward (ψ).
For messages received from misbehaving vehicles, EVN
decreases the trust level with the punishment factor (ρ).
2) TI : is, on the other hand, calculated based on the mes-
sage forward capability of the sending vehicle (VS). Therefore,
DTM calculates TI based on Equation 2. The highest trust is
assigned to vehicles which are broadcasting a high number of
trusted messages. This level decreases as soon as the vehicle
starts to drop the messages. Once, TD and TI are identified,
EVN calculates the overall trust on VS via Equation 4
Trust(EVN,VS)(t) =
√
Trust(EVN,VS)(t− 1)×
√
TD × TI
(4)
EVN accepts messages only if the overall trust is above
trust threshold. Otherwise, it discards the messages and cate-
gorised the vehicle as malicious and misbehaving.
C. CTM
To validate our proposal, we implement an event-oriented
TM, known as Vehicular Security through Reputation and
Plausibility checks (VSRP) [21]. As the name suggests, this
TM highly rely on the reputation of the vehicles for trust
computation. In this TM, neighbours are first identified by
EVN for initial evaluations using broadcast packets. EVN
only accepts messages from the neighbours if a non-zero
entry is available in its trust table. Next, EVN calculates
trust on the messages received from such neighbours based
on two parameters. (1) threshold range, and (2) detection
range. If neighbour lies outside the threshold range, then EVN
discards messages from such neighbours directly, assuming it
to be malicious. However, for a message to be received from
vehicles located within threshold range, then EVN performs
second check on its detection range. In the detection range,
EVN has a direct line-of-sight to the event. Therefore, any
message which contradicts the EVN opinion is categorised as
malicious and it is discarded and the trust level is decreased
with a punishment factor ρ. The message is accepted only
if the neighbour agrees with EVN by providing correct
information, as a result, trust is increased with an honesty
factor (ψ).
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Simulation Scenario
The proposed trust evaluation mechanism is implemented in
OMNET++ [22] and VEINS [23], [24], which is a widely used
open source framework, is adopted for modelling VANET. We
validated our proposal on a real map from the city of Derby,
United Kingdom which we extracted from OpenStreetMap
[25] as shown in Figure 3. Further, we relied on SUMO
[26], [27] to generate traffic on this map, where we generated
mobility of 100 vehicles. Moreover, we equipped all the
vehicles with standard IEEE 802.11p communication module
to enable them to communicate and share event (i.e., accident)
information with each other.
Fig. 3. Simulated Map of Derby, United Kingdom
Since the scope of this research work is to evaluate the
performance of TMs in VANET under adversarial conditions,
we have considered on-off attacks which can act as man-in-
the-middle to drop and delay transmitted packets. In order
to facilitate our simulations, we introduced 10% attackers and
we then increased their proportion to 80% with a step of 10%.
This mechanism will allow us to study the efficiency of TMs
under both low and high quantity of malicious nodes. Further
important details are highlighted in Table I.
TABLE I
SIMULATION DETAILS
Parameters Details
Total Simulation Time 1000 seconds
Simulation Area 4km × 2.5 km
Total No. of Vehicles 100
Total No. of RSUs 5
Total No. of Malicious Nodes 10%, 20%, ... , 80%
MAC Protocol IEEE 802.11p
Network Protocol IEEE 1609.4 (WAVE)
Packet Size (Data + Header) 1280 (1024 + 256) bits
Initial Trust 0.5
Trust Threshold 0.5
Honesty Factor (ψ) 0.01
Punishment Factor (ρ) 0.1
We executed every simulation scenario twenty-five times
with random speed value to ensure the unique initial assign-
ment of every vehicle within the network. Moreover, each
simulation results are presented as an average of twenty-five
runs for each simulation scenario.
B. Evaluation Metrics
To evaluate the efficiency of TMs via our proposal, we
considered the following four metrics:
1) False Positive Rate (FPR): FPR illustrates the ability of
the TMs to identify those misbehaving nodes which are incor-
rectly identified as legitimate nodes. Hence, FPR represents
the error margin within the TMs. Ideally, the TMs with low
FPR values are suggested in VANET due to the involvement
of critical and sensitive information [28]. Let PM |H describes
the probability of detecting vehicle as misbehaving, given the
vehicle is honest, and PH|H is the probability of detecting
vehicle as honest, given the vehicle is honest, then FPR is
expressed as:
FPR =
PM |H
PH|H + PM |H
(5)
2) Precision: Precision is widely used to calculate the ac-
curacy in information retrieval [6], [29]. Let PM |H represents
probability to detect node as malicious, given legitimate node
and PM |M is the probability to detect node as malicious, given
malicious node, then precision is given as:
Precision =
PM |M
PM |H + PM |M
(6)
3) Recall: Recall, on the other hand, is also an important
parameter within information retrieval to calculate its accuracy
[6], [29]. Recall identifies the capability of TM to correctly
detect misbehaving nodes. Let PM |M presents the probability
of TM to detect node as malicious, given node is malicious
and PH|M resents probability of detecting malicious node as
legitimate node, given the node is malicious, then Recall can
be mathematically expressed as:
Recall =
PM |M
PH|M + PM |M
(7)
In this paper, both Precision and Recall values are calculated
in order to identify accuracy level of the TM to correctly
identify misbehaving nodes.
4) F-Measure: F-Measure, a weighted average of precision
and recall is an important metric which can evaluate the
accuracy of the TMs [30]. The higher the F-Measure, the
higher accuracy of the TM. F-Measure can be mathematically
given as:
F −Measure = 2× Precision×Recall
Precision+Recall
(8)
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
The accuracy of the TMs is depicted in Figs. 4 to 6 in terms
of precision, recall and F-measure. It clearly depicts that when
we increase the number of malicious nodes in the network,
precision, recall and F-measure decreases significantly. Pre-
cision of the TMs is depicted in Fig 4, stating that for low
number of malicious nodes, all the TMs can detect malicious
content generated by these malicious nodes as the precision
achieved is over 90%. However, this precision decreases below
85% when high number of malicious nodes are introduced in
the network. Further, ETM achieves higher precision values
than DTM and CTM. For a network with 50% malicious
nodes, ETM achieves 10.8% and 5.7% precision values than
DTM and CTM respectively. This is due to the ironic nature
of ETM where trust is computed via ROT and EOT. These
methods (ROT and EOT) ensure that the malicious nodes are
identified correctly in the network.
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Fig. 4. Precision
Similarly, recall of the TMs is given in Fig. 5, stating that
with the injection of malicious nodes in the network, the ability
of the TMs to truly detect actual misbehaving nodes decreases.
This is due to the fact that the high number of malicious nodes
can compromise the integrity of the messages and hence they
can dominate the network and the legitimate nodes. Further,
Fig. 5 suggests that ETM performs better than both DTM and
CTM in terms of recall. Specifically, ETM achieves 5.88% and
4.4% higher recall values than DTM and CTM respectively
when the network is simulated with 50% malicious nodes.
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Fig. 5. Recall
Finally, Fig. 6 identifies an important metric to evaluate
TMs, i.e., F-measure. Since, previous metrics suggested that
the distribution of malicious nodes in the network can affect
the performance of VANET, therefore, this metric is helpful to
understand how accurate the TM is in identifying malicious
nodes and their content. Fig. 6 further depicts that in terms
of F-measure, ETM can accurately identify true content in
presence of high number malicious nodes, i.e., ETM is 8.37%
and 5% more accurate than DTM and CTM when the network
contains 50% malicious nodes. This is due to the presence
of vehicles with highest roles and experience in the network
which have the ability to identify malicious nodes and the
content they generate.
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Malicious Nodes (%)
60
65
70
75
80
85
90
95
100
F-
M
ea
su
re
 (%
)
F-Measure
ETM
DTM
CTM
Fig. 6. F-Measure
Figure 7 represents the false positive rate (FPR) for three
TMs (ETM, DTM and CTM). As stated earlier, the FPR
for the TMs should be at minimum level in VANET. Figure
7 depicts that all the TMs achieve low FPR even if the
network is polluted with high number of malicious nodes.
However, comparing the three TMs in terms of FPR, we
can see that ETM outperforms both DTM and CTM where
FPR is maintained at minimum level. For a network with
50% adversaries, ETM achieves about 27.2% and 55.45%
better FPR values than DTM and CTM respectively. This is
due to the fact that ETM relies on both ROT and EOT for
trust computation, thus increasing the probability of detecting
high number of false positives in the network. On the other
hand, DTM and CTM evaluates trust on data, which can be
compromised by adversaries, thus, increasing the probability
of propagating false positive across the network.
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VI. CONCLUSION
We have presented various trust models (TMs) for VANETs
which are broadly categorised into three categories, namely
entity-oriented (ETM), data-oriented (DTM) and combined
trust models (CTM). These TMs evaluate trust on the data or
on the entity or both via different mechanisms. Our research
provided a mechanism to evaluate these TMs in term of
security and trust, where the accuracy of the TMs is evaluated
in terms of misbehaving nodes and faulty information dissem-
ination under different scenarios. Our paper has identified the
capabilities and the limitations of each simulated TM. It was
clear that the ETM outperformed DTM and CTM on different
criteria, due to the use of (1) Role-oriented trust (ROT ), and
(2) Experience-oriented trust (EOT ) for trust computation.
These metrics seem to reflect real applications/scenarios and
should be considered for further development in VANET. The
results and the analysis could be used for further development
of TMs and improvement of existing models.
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